INTRODUCTION
The central question on the use of investment treaty arbitration in adjudicating claims arising from sovereign debt default was lucidly raised by Prof. George Abi Saab in his dissenting opinion in the famous Abaclat"s case in the following words: "Do ICSID tribunals have jurisdiction over sovereigndebt instruments issued internationally, expressed in foreign currency and payable abroad, governed by various external laws and subject to the jurisdiction of various external courts, and traded as dematerialised security entitlements in global capital markets?" 1 This question adds precision to an increasingly unsettled area of international adjudication. The question also reflects the growing controversies in this area. Indeed, over the years the utility of international investment arbitration in Sovereign Debt Restructuring (SDR) has generated a lot of scholarly discourse and sharply polarized academic opinions on the subject. 2 But despite initial skepticism, international arbitration is gradually becoming an option for addressing claims arising from sovereign debt defaults.
3 This is understandable because of the absence of a legal framework for SDR at the international level 4 and the fact that international investment agreements (IIAs) typically make provisions for investment treaty arbitration and other substantive investment protections. 5 Investors have been availing themselves of these investment protections. 6 However, extending these guarantees to the realm of sovereign debt default is not without challenges partly because of the novelty of the claims as well as the uncertainty, disparity and lack of uniformity characterizing the current legal regime on SDR. 7 Thus, while some scholars consider investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) through arbitration in disputes arising from sovereign debt default and restructuring as an obstacle to effective SDR by debtor countries, 8 others maintain that investment treaty arbitration offers a viable and fairly balanced option for both sovereign debtors and creditors. 9 Recent incidents of sovereign default have shown that an ISDS mechanism can offer thousands of creditors the rare opportunity of dragging sovereign debtors before arbitral tribunals in order to ensure the enforcement of their claims using the substantive guarantees provided under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) between their home state and the sovereign debtors. Before the advent of investment treaty arbitration, enforcement of sovereign debt took a variety of forms including intervention by creditors" States often through the use of force. 10 BITs seem to have changed the dynamics by providing an alternative route through investment treaty arbitration. 11 In addition, countries are cautiously remodeling their BITs with some ousting sovereign debt instruments from arbitral jurisdiction 12 while others are removing or downplaying the ISDS provisions in their BITs. 13 Other countries simply denounced their ICSID membership on ideological or other grounds. 14 This article examines the contending perspectives on the use of investment arbitration in sovereign debt crises through the juris prudence of International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Over the past decade, ICSID tribunals have become the locus of this debate with holdout bondholders increasingly using them to seek enforcement of their claims. 15 The ICSID awards also re-echoed the dilemma of creditors in the current regime of SDR. They equally raised fundamental questions regarding the capacity of the international financial system to deal with issues related to sovereign debt default. In other words, they re-ignited the debate and the calls for a global legal framework on SDR. 16 Against the backdrop of the perspectives of both ICSID tribunals and scholars as well as the recurring sovereign debt crises around the world, this article argues that minimizing sovereign debt crises requires some form of flexibility with a sound theoretical basis and a careful reconnection to the root of general international law. The article argues that investment arbitrations and SDR ought not to be in a collision course if we reflect on 12 Thrasher & Gallagher (n 2) 17-19. By February 2015, at least 45 countries were revising their model BITs. See UNCTAD, ISDS 2015 (n 11) 1. 13 the significance of parties" consent in general international law. A fundamental element missing in this discourse has been the failure to recognize the fact that today, both international investment law and modern sovereign debt scheme largely involve consensual "investor-state" relationships and that the increasing rejection of this reality by some arbitrators and scholars is unhelpful to the overall goal of developing an effective legal framework for SDR. Thus, accepting international investment arbitration as a method of sovereign debt crises resolution will create the needed balance, certainty and ultimately enhance creditor confidence and debt sustainability for debtor countries. However, for this to succeed the observed lapses in the current ISDS mechanism must be addressed.
To articulate the above arguments, the rest of the article is structured as follows: Section I examines the nature of international investment arbitration as well as the nature of sovereign debt, sovereign default and sovereign debt restructuring. Section II shows how international arbitration is gradually being employed to adjudicate over disputes arising from sovereign debt default. Section III reviews the contending positions to see their respective arguments on the issue and to support the need for ISDS in SDR. Section IV advances the argument that with the blessing of parties" consent investment arbitration is suitable for adjudicating disputes arising from SDR. Section V concludes with some suggestions.
I. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND ISSUES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
To appreciate the contending views on the use of investment arbitration in disputes arising from SDR, a conceptual foundation is important here.
A. International Investment Arbitration & the ICSID
Since the second half of the 20th century, investor-state dispute settlement has become a central feature of international investment law.
17
ISDS is a mechanism for ordered resolution of investment disputes mostly through invocation of arbitration provisions of bilateral and other investment agreements. 18 In the words of Abbott and others, ISDS "grants investors the right to call for arbitration in the event that they believe that 17 20 Arbitration as a concept involves a determination of disputes by an independent third party other than the court pursuant to the agreement of parties. 21 It is an adversarial process leading to a binding, enforceable award. 22 Parties have crucial role in constituting the tribunal. Therefore, international investment arbitration allows investors" access to a neutral, depoliticized and relatively independent and flexible adjudication forum in the event of a host government"s untoward conducts amounting to either an expropriation or anyviolation of a treaty obligation or actionable guarantee under the treaty. 23 Indeed, ISDS is the cornerstone of investment protection as it "serves as a procedural enforcement mechanism for the core substantive provisions" of BITs. 24 The substantive investment guarantees normally come in the form of common investment standards such as the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard, most favored nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) standards. 25 As noted above, prior to the institutionalization of ISDS, foreign investors were at the mercy of their home states. 26 Today however, thousands of BITs enable investors to directly drag their host governments to arbitral tribunals for adjudication thereby eliminating the circuitous diplomatic route with its attendant negatives. 27 Although there are notable variations in the language of the ISDS and the expropriation provisions of these BITs, there seems to be a general consensus about their ultimate objective of creating a level-playing ground for investors vis-à-vis their host governments when a dispute arises. 28 These are perhaps the most important provisions in modern BITs.
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Most BITs specify the conditions for recourse to arbitration as well as the forum for the resolution of the disputes. 30 Although ICSID is one of many arbitral institutions, it is however, at the center of the sovereign debt restructuring debate as revealed by the increasing number of cases being handled by ICSID tribunals. ICSID, as an institution of the World Bank Group (WB), was established under the Washington Convention to primarily provide the institutional framework that will effectively facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between foreign investors and their host governments. 31 Apart from providing an arbitration forum for investors, it enables States to improve their investment climate, attract foreign capital by allaying the fears of investors and avoiding diplomatic tensions or unnecessary international litigations. 32 Not surprisingly, today ICSID is the preferred arbitral institution for aggrieved investors.
33
The jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals is determined by an "intersection" between the Washington Convention and the investment treaty upon which a complaint is founded. 34 But, as noted above, the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals over creditors" claims arising from sovereign debt default has remained deeply controversial. 35 As will be discussed in Section III infra, one of the key objectives of the WB in establishing the ICSID was to provide foreign investors a direct access to "an international tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with Governments". 36 Disputes arising from sovereign debt defaults should ordinarily be part of "financial and economic disputes with governments". But until the Argentine debt 29 An OECD study found that 93% of 1660 BITs studied had ISDS provisions. See Pohl and others, ISDS Sample Survey (n 13) 7. 30 crisis of 2001, sovereign debtors were rarely brought to ICSID-based arbitration for debt default perhaps because of the uncertainty regarding the nature of investments capable of conferring jurisdiction on ICSID tribunals. 37 Though it did not directly define what is an investment, Article 25 of the Washington Convention provides the jurisdictional base for ICSID arbitration, which is the consent of the parties plus "a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment" between a national of a State party and a State party to the Washington Convention. Whether sovereign debts qualify as "investment" under the Washington Convention for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on ICSID Tribunals is still debatable point.
B. Sovereign Debts and Default in International Finance
Modern international finance involves the "provision of finance at a financial center by foreign lenders to foreign borrowers largely in a currency which is not the currency of the financial center". 38 Therefore, the problems associated with sovereign debt largely reflect the contextual and multijurisdictional complexities that characterize international finance itself. It is important to examine the nature of sovereign debt and default here.
Nature and Forms of Sovereign Debts
(1) Sovereign Debt as Contract It is debatable whether sovereign debt is a form of loan contract.
39 But in so far as there is a lender providing funds to a borrower in need, then sovereign debt may qualify as a form of "loan" contract. 40 The concept of "loan" presupposes the mutuality of minds that characterizes general contracts. 41 Parties freely assume obligations to realize commercial objectives. Loan is however, a unique form of contract because of its inherent character of asymmetrical performance: One party lends and the 37 other subsequently repays over a period of time. 42 In the words of Aguir "payments are typically contingent only on time". 43 This asymmetrical performance is equally an inherent feature of sovereign debt. But like other forms of contract, effective and efficient legal system, certainty and predictability in terms of enforcement are of fundamental importance in assuring the parties to loan contracts of the desired legal protection. 44 For the creditors, this assurance is critical to the integrity of the agreement itself as it provides them the needed protection against possible default.
Borrowing is a viable financing option for entrepreneurs, corporations, public entities and national and sub-national governments. Indeed, for countries borrowing is generally considered to be good for development purposes. 45 Therefore, sovereign debt is a product of loan contract and consists of the accumulated financial undertakings or the aggregate of all claims against a country as monitored and recognized by countries, international financial institutions and the international financial system in general. 46 It is a "debt issued or guaranteed by the government of a sovereign state". 47 It has certain peculiar features that distinguish it from other forms of borrowing: It is an instrument of monetary policy; it is susceptible to market volatility, internal and external forces and general political risks; and "creditors have much more limited legal resources if a sovereign debtor fails to make a contracted payment". 48 It may not fit the character of a loan under a municipal system but it is submitted that it is a loan nonetheless. The sovereign status of the borrower does not change the character of the transaction although it makes this loan unique and less attractive to lenders.
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(2) Forms of Sovereign Debt Borrowing by governments takes a variety of forms: It could be either domestic or external depending on the governing laws and sources of such funds. While domestic borrowing by governments is normally regulated through specific legislative instruments without much difficulty, external borrowing presents particularly complex enforcement and multi-jurisdictional 42 issues. Domestic debt is denominated in local currency and exclusively controlled by the domestic legal system and therefore is not normally subject to international investment arbitrational though it may be susceptible to adverselegislative measures or other actions of government. 50 On the other hand, "external debt is expressed in some foreign currency, typically payable abroad, governed by some external law and subject to the jurisdiction of externalcourts". 51 Thus, different systems of law are potentially applicable.
52
Conflicts of law and jurisdiction clauses are invariably inserted by the parties to determine the forum and the "proper" (or governing) law. 53 Furthermore, external debt may come in the form of bilateral official loan between governments or their authorized agencies. 54 Secondly, it could be a debt owed to international financial institutions (IFIs). These two forms of loan are often described as official loans. 55 Private investors are not involved. But these forms of borrowing are gradually being de-emphasized due to some concerns of moral hazards and the flexibility of bonds.
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External debt can also be in the form of a "syndicated bank loan" otherwise called "multi-currency loans" consisting of separate loans made by different banks to the same borrower. 57 In both official and syndicated bank loans there is a sort of direct relationship between the borrower and the lender. This is unlike sovereign bonds as we now examine.
(3) Sovereign Bonds The commonest but complex form of sovereign financing today is by issuing of sovereign bonds. It enables sovereign borrowers to obtain longterm financing by way of issuing bonds in international capital markets. Bonds are fixed-income securities by which a bondholder extends money to an entity for a defined period of time and at certain interest rates. 58 It is still debatable whether sovereign bonds are loan contracts. 61 As it will be examined in the next section, the tribunal in Postova Banka"s case held that they are not. 62 This is arguable. But unlike the official and syndicated bank loans, sovereign bonds do not create a direct relationship between the borrower and the multitude of bondholders who purchase their securities on the secondary markets. In as much as the bondholder has legitimate expectations and rights as against the sovereign issuer, it is difficult to argue that there is no privity between the parties as held by some arbitral tribunals. 63 Like other investors, bondholders are entitled to a return on their investments in the form of interest. Apart from the contextual variations and the peculiar circumstances of the cases to be considered later, it may be argued that excluding bondholders from the meaning of "investors" seems oblivious of the core objectives of sovereign bonds.
From the above, sovereign bonds are species of international bonds issued in capital markets, traded on the secondary markets and target investors worldwide. Thus, the bondholders need not have any direct relationship with the sovereign debtor but they have certain rights as against the debtor. It is submitted that the reciprocal contractual obligations created by the definitive bonds makes it tenuous to argue that no privity of contract exists between the bondholders and the sovereign debtor. 64 (4) Sovereign Debt as a Treaty Obligation Like other forms of sovereign debt, it is still debatable whether sovereign bonds constitute a subject matter of investment treaty arbitration. 65 This raises fundamental questions in the area of debt restructuring. Ordinarily, their enforcement is governed by the contractual documents. Recently however, bondholders have been resorting to ISDS to challenge sovereign debt defaults and restructuring which may have affected their rights with a view to reclaiming the full value of their investment.
Indeed, ICSID tribunals have made pronouncements on this issue as discussed in the next section. The prevailing view is that sovereign debt does not merely give a contractual cause of action; it is also capable of giving rise to treaty claims depending on the context and language of the BIT. 67 The question is: Can sovereign debt defaults and restructuring qualify as violation of BIT obligations? This too depends to alarge extent on the language of the BIT and the nature of the sovereign debt restructuring in question.
Sovereign Default and Restructuring
Sovereign default is the inability or refusal of a sovereign debtor to make payments as they become due. 68 Standard & Poor describes it as "missed payments on interest or principal of bonds or bank loans". 69 For sovereign bonds this occurs when the debtor fails a scheduled debt service on the due date or merely exchanges new debts under less favorable terms than the original bonds. 70 It is principally determined by time and contractual terms. Default usually follows economic crises in the debtor country. 71 Other triggers include worsening terms of trade, poor macroeconomic policies, increase in borrowing cost, structure of sovereign"s debt port-folio, market perceptions, poor sovereign ratings and systemic banking crises. 72 Any of these factors could lead to either a partial or a complete default. 73 restructure their debts in the light of their financial and economic situations. Thus, SDR consists of various methods of altering the repayment plan under the original agreement to respond to actual or anticipated default. It involves "an exchange of outstanding sovereign debt instruments, such as loans or bonds, for new debt instruments or cash". 76 Its effects include slashing down the expected returns of the creditors. Thus, it could amount to a violation of either the bonds indenture or a treaty obligation. 77 But default simplicita does not necessarily invoke a state"s international responsibility because it is considered as a contractual breach. 78 Defaults have remained recurring hallmarks of sovereign lending since the medieval times. 79 An ILA Study Group has found that almost all sovereign debtors have defaulted over the past century and that sovereign defaults tend to occur at the rate of one to three in every year. 80 Indeed, history has shown that sovereign default affects country"s development drive. 81 In 2002, Argentina made a record-breaking default leading to several litigations before domestic courts mostly in the US. 82 The creditors expanded their options by filing claims before ICSID tribunals seeking to reclaim their investments. 83 As will be shown infra, the tribunals handed down ground breaking jurisdiction awards that could have profound impact on the future of sovereign debt restructuring.
While the cases against Argentina were pending, the global financial crises struck in 2008. This leds to increased government borrowing to address budget deficits, plunging so many countries into financial crises and forcing them to default on their sovereign debt commitments. 84 A notable case was the Greek debt default of 2015, which followed series of failed negotiations with the IMF and the Euro Group. 85 The Greek default also led to another round of claims through investment arbitration. 86 Therefore, decisions with far reaching effects were made by ICSID tribunals in both the Argentine and Greek debt crises respectively. As reviewed later, these decisions re-echoed the persistent problems of restructuring sovereign debts particularly those incurred by way of sovereign bonds issue.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF SDR: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION TO THE RESCUE?
Prior to the Argentine debt default, there were some proposals for the use of arbitration in resolving sovereign debt disputes. 87 But it was the Argentine debt crisis of 2001 that literally opened the "Pandora"s Box" 88 for recourse to ISDS in challenging sovereign debt restructuring. As noted above, sovereign debts create rights under two regimes: treaty and contractual claims. 89 SDR could affect creditors" rights, which in turn might violatesubstantive and procedural investment guarantees under BITs. For official loans and syndicated bank loans, the IMF, London and Paris Clubs offered different frameworks for relatively orderly restructuring of sovereign debts. 90 But for sovereign bonds, bondholders seem to be in a dilemma: either accept the sovereign debtor"s proposed debt restructuring plan or forego their original claims. There is also the problem of holdout creditors who might frustrate any orderly restructuring. Unfortunately, international finance is still ill equipped to deal with this dilemma. 91 Therefore, the major problem is the lack of an acceptable, universal legal framework for the enforcement of creditors" claims while balancing the debtors" desire for a return to debt sustainability. 92 This has been described as "a missing link in international financial architecture". 93 It is manifested by the disorderly debt restructuring methods with poor creditor coordination, disparate processes and prolonged negotiations. 94 Although the collective action clauses (CACs) have emerged to remedy the collective action and holdout problems in sovereign bonds, they could not address the "too little, too late" problem. 95 Other connected problems include lack of institutional legitimacy and inefficiency. 96 Furthermore, the present SD system has a disparate institutional process of negotiation in the event of default. This is because sovereign debt restructuring largely reflects the nature of the debt itself and the institutional framework, hence bilateral debts, multilateral debts, bank loans and bonds are necessarily treated differently for this purpose.
97 Except in few cases, multilateral debts managed by IFIs are largely not restructured owing to their special status. 98 In the case of sovereign bonds, the collective action problem and the possibility of holdouts makes SDR even more complex and challenging. 99 Despite the provisions for forum selection in bonds instruments, the forum for resolution of disputes arising from sovereign debt default has remained a key challenge for both creditors and debtors. 100 For the debtor, the multiplicity of creditors and potential suits in multiple jurisdictions poses significant challenges of coordination. 101 For the "indirect claimants" there is the problem of exclusion due to the informal and non-public character of the negotiations.
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In the light of these problems, investment arbitration is gradually being pursued especially to address creditors" dilemma in the event of sovereign debt default and restructuring but not without resistance from sovereign debtors. Interestingly, bondholders find solace in the Washington Convention as they invoke the ISDS provisions and the various investment guarantees under BITs to activate the arbitration machinery. This emerging trend is not uncontroversial as there are contending perspectives with respect to the policy implications of this approach especially in view of some ICSID tribunals" decisions on the subject. 94 
III. THE CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES AND THE POSITION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS
As noted above, creditors of sovereign debtors, especially bondholders have now resorted to ISDS in challenging sovereign debt restructuring with a view to reclaiming the full value of their investments. However, this is far from generating the needed consensus among scholars and arbitral tribunals. There are two contending views on the use of investment arbitration in claims arising from SDR. The task now is to examine these contending views.
A. Arguments against International Arbitration
Many scholars have expressed deep skepticisms about dragging sovereign debtors before arbitral tribunals.
103 Michael Waibel led the skeptics in his seminal article on the subject arguing that at the point of conception of ICSID, sovereign debt was not contemplated as a "typical investment" and that bond contracts in particular contemplate contractual rather than treaty remedies. 104 The main arguments of the skeptics are summarized below.
Sovereign Debt Claims Are Ill-Suited for Investment Arbitration
The skeptics contend that ICSID Arbitration was originally tailored for "typical investments" and not sovereign debt. A typical investment must meet some basic tests including the Salini tests:
105 sufficient duration, territorial link, risk sharing, substantial commitment, regularity of returns and contribution to the development of the host state. 106 Although some debt instruments were interpreted as falling within the scope of "investment" for ICSID arbitration, 107 the skeptics argued that ICSID tribunals have no jurisdiction over debt instruments especially sovereign bonds because these are essentially commercial transactions governed by municipal laws and are therefore outside the "core investment" under article 25 of the Washington Convention.
108
As will be examined infra, this view had influenced both the dissenting opinion in Abaclat and the decision in Postova Banka. The problem with this argument is that it interpreted "typical investment" almost consciously to exclude sovereign debt instruments. For instance, the "sharing of risk" argument that the mere risk of default is inadequate 109 failed to appreciate the true implication of the word "risk" in sovereign debt-like investments as examined earlier. Secondly, if sovereign debts are "commercial" 110 transactions but not loans, then it seems curious whether it is possible to have a "non-commercial" loan. If both are "commercial" in nature, then it becomes a distinction without a difference.
Exclusive Domestic Jurisdiction in Bonds Contract
The skeptics also argued that unlike a typical investment, sovereign debts especially sovereign bonds contemplate contractual remedies obtainable in the domestic courts.
111 They maintained that unlike typical investment contracts, in sovereign bondsthe law of the host state "does not govern the bond; its courts do not enjoy jurisdiction; and bondholders are guaranteed access to an impartial forum" (in other jurisdictions) and therefore using investment arbitration "would undermine legal certainty in the sovereign debt market and… upset long-standing expectations". 112 They however acknowledged that not all bond contracts confer exclusive jurisdiction on specific domestic courts. The Postova Banka Jurisdiction award equally knocked this argument on its head because the host State"s law like in the cases of the so-called typical investment governed the bonds there.
Substantive Protections, Holdout Creditors and Policy Considerations
According to the skeptics, most of the substantive investment protections in BITs cannot conveniently address the predicament of creditors of sovereign debtors. 113 In addition, given the volatility of the sovereign debt markets, the "prompt, effective and adequate" standard of compensation would become nugatory since the market value ex post would be less than the face value of the bonds.
114 Therefore, the skeptics advocate the inclusion of collective action clause (CAC) and argued that SDR pursuant to a CAC in the bond contract is a mere "modification" amounting to a "contractual restructuring" and not a "sovereign act", which could violate a treaty obligation. 115 The skeptics also advanced some policy arguments. First, the promise of a successful ICSID arbitration could encourage holdouts and unravel any debt restructuring. Second, investment arbitration could conflict with the institutional roles of the IMF and development banks in addressing debt unsustainability of countries. 116 Third, international tribunals are incompetent to determine sovereign debtor"s payment capacity in the event of an award. Fourth, apart from the likelihood of creditor moral hazard, the number of claims will increase thereby diverting ICSID from its core mandates. 117 It is clear that the above arguments were advanced to segregate international investment law"s established ISDS mechanism from international financial law"s undeveloped dispute resolution mechanism with regard to SDR. It is however curious that the peculiarities of one form of sovereign debt (i.e. sovereign bonds) were used to discountenance the use of investment arbitration in SDR regardless of the forms of the debt. In addition, the skeptics were oblivious of the fact that without arbitration of these types of claims by international tribunals, the status quo is one-sided as it does not take cognizance of any "equality of arms" between the contracting parties. In other words, SDR without recourse to arbitration is largely debtor-determined.
B. Arguments in Favor of International Investment Arbitration
Admittedly, the above arguments raised some legitimate concerns. Apart from the above criticisms however, the arguments were countered by other scholars.
118 Their arguments which we find more appealing are summarized below.
The Coverage of Sovereign Debts Depends on the Intention of Parties to BIT
It is tenuous to argue that sovereign debt instruments are ill suited for investment treaty arbitration on account of the so-called typical investments because investment arbitration, like other aspects of international law, is founded on the parties" consent. 119 If the parties to a BIT expressly included sovereign debt instruments as "investments", then an arbitral tribunal must respect the parties" intention. 120 Indeed, parties" intention seems to implicitly favour investment arbitration since both before and after Argentina"shistoric default, countries signed BITs without express exclusion of sovereign debt instruments from the covered investments in the treaty. This is a clear indication of countries" intention to include sovereign debts as covered investments. There should therefore be a general presumption in favor of sovereign debt instruments except where expressly excluded. 121 This is because serious negotiations always precede the conclusion of BITs.
In addition, contractual and treaty claims are not mutually exclusive.
122
The "umbrella clause" in BITs enables investors to have recourse to investment treaty arbitration. Indeed, once a claim meets the conditions for jurisdiction and admissibility, it can be adjudicated upon regardless of the availability of a cause of action in contract 123 as "a State may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa." 124 The important condition is that once submitted to ICSID, the other forum lacks jurisdiction over the same claims. 125 legislative measures that often affect creditors" rights as happened in Argentina and Greece. Regardless of the economic justifications, these measures, depending on the context and the terms of the BIT, could touch on a debtor"s treaty obligations such as those of non-expropriation, FET, NT and MFN. 126 Secondly, far from undermining the institutional roles of IMF in sovereign debt crises management, an enforceable arbitral award could make this institutional intervention unnecessary 127 thereby avoiding the diplomatic complications which could "undermine a key purpose of international investment agreements-the promotion of foreign investment." 128 On the incompetence of ICSID tribunals to determine a sovereign debtor"s capacity to repay, the proponents argued that the alternative is even worse since it allows the debtor and domestic courtsthe powers to do the same. 129 Indeed, an arbitral institution might develop consistent and uniform principles for this purpose.
Equality of Bargaining Power and other Policy Arguments
As noted earlier, an effective, depoliticized adjudicating forum to resolve claims arising from SDR provides a level-playing ground for both creditors and their sovereign borrowers. The proponents maintain that presently exchange offers are done largely on the debtor"s terms, on a takeit-or-leave-it basis and this lacks transparency as it completely ignores creditors" voice. 130 This makes SDR a one-sided affair. 131 It goes against the contractual spirit that the skeptics emphasized on. In addition, judgments of national courts may face enforcement constraints including sovereign immunity. Therefore, investment arbitration could provide the needed balance with a promise of compliance. This is because under the Washington Convention, arbitral awards are final, binding and enforceable in all member countries. 132 This could in turn create creditor confidence in the debt market leading to a "greater access to financing for all states". Therefore, flowing from the above, it is submitted that the emerging trend in sovereign debt claims seems to clearly favor the second view. This position will be clearer with the aid of arbitral jurisprudence, which we now turn to.
C. The Perspective of ICSID Tribunals
It is important to evaluate the growing trend from the perspectives of ICSID arbitrators in at least three jurisdiction awards. The conclusions support the claim that investment arbitration is a viable answer to some of the problems of SDR.
Abaclat v. Republic of Argentina
Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, Argentina restructured its economy.
134 It issued 179 bonds worth over US$186.7 billion in both domestic and foreign capital markets. 135 Out of the 179 bonds, 173 were denominated in foreign currencies and the Claimants allegedly purchased 83 of the 173 foreign currency bonds, which were governed by the laws of different jurisdictions and traded on various capital markets around the world.
136 By the late 1990s, the Argentine economy was in deep recession and by December 2001 it defaulted over US$100 billion of external bond debt. 137 Following the enactment of the Public Emergency and Reform Law of 2002, Argentina lunched two Exchange Offers in 2005 and 2010 respectively. The Emergency Law prohibited a re-opening of the Offers thereby preventing eligible but un-exchanged bonds from being renegotiated. The claimants did not participate in both Exchange Offers. They filed their request for arbitration before ICSID challenging, among others, the unilateral debt restructuring as expropriation and a violation of the FET standard under the Italy-Argentina BIT, 1990. 138 Argentina questioned ICSID tribunal"s jurisdiction arguing that it was "an unprecedented abuse of the investment treaty regime" and "a legally unsupported attempt to turn a sovereign"s non-payment of external debt into a violation of investment treaty protection". 139 Since the bondholders purchased their security claims on the secondary markets, it argued that they were not investors as contemplated by the Washington Convention. Interestingly, Argentina advanced a policy argument against the claim insisting that ICSID tribunal proceedings were inappropriate in claims arising from SDR and would be "counterproductive" 140 as holdout creditors were "the biggest threat to the stability and fairness of sovereign debt restructuring." 141 The claimants responded that "opening the door to ICSID arbitration would create a supplementary leverage against such rogue debtors and therefore be beneficial to the efficiency of foreign debt restructuring."
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The majority decision of the tribunal disagreed with the position of Argentina and held that the tribunal has jurisdiction over "investments" by way of sovereign bonds, noting that issues of public policy were for the parties to consider at the point of negotiating the BIT. 143 However, in his dissenting view Prof. George Abi Saab held that the Washington Convention did not "foresee" or contemplate sovereign bonds as covered investments and assuming jurisdiction by the tribunal will lead "to tenuous anduntenable interpretations … over-stretching the text beyond the breaking point, in order to extend jurisdiction to where it does not exist…" 144 . Prof. Abi Saab did not however answer another vital question that he raised at the end of his opinion: "what is the proper and prudential course for ICSID tribunals to take in this regard?" 145 We shall revisit this question after reviewing the other cases.
Alemanni v. Republic of Argentina 146
The background facts in this case were similar to those of Abaclat"s. Based on the formal default by Argentina, the claimants alleged breaches of the guarantees under the same BIT with respect to FET and the prohibition of expropriation. Among other objections to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, Argentina argued that "investment arbitration is an inherently unsuitable and unacceptable way of dealing with default on sovereign bonded debt". 147 The tribunal held that the complaints "are capable of constituting a breach of one or more of the provisions of the BIT". 148 It held that as investors under a BIT, the claimants could use arbitration to enforce their claims. While disagreeing with the dissenting opinion of Prof. Abi Saab in Abaclat, which imported "policy considerations into one area while vigorously rejecting them in others", the tribunal held "As a fact of international economic life, sovereign bond issues were plainly within the normal field of contemplation of the Contracting Parties." The global financial crises of 2008 led to the downgrading of Greek sovereign bonds including the ones held by the claimants. 150 Unlike the situation in Abaclat, the Greek law governed the bonds in contention. 151 The Greek government issued the bonds to the participants of the Bank of Greece"s Securities System. The participants delivered the bonds to the primary dealers who provided the funds and sold the bonds on the secondary markets. 152 The financial situation of the country deteriorated despite the intervention of the IMF and the Euro Group. In 2012, the Greek Bondholder Act was enacted paving way for the debt restructuring. 153 A Private Creditor-Investor Committee negotiated a haircut on the face value of the Greek debt and the government declared this to be the only available offer to bondholders. 154 Through their intermediary, the claimants rejected the Exchange Offer and filed a request for arbitration to reclaim the value of the bonds. Greece raised objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the tribunal upheld the objections. 155 After examining the peculiarities of sovereign debt, the tribunal distinguished the facts of the case from Abaclat"s and held that the BITs under which the claims were filed excluded the sovereign bonds in question as "investments". 156 Curiously however the tribunal held that since the bonds were purchased at the secondary market through an intermediary, there was no privity of contract between the parties. 157 But even if there was privity, the crucial point is that the parties to the BIT hadexcluded sovereign bonds from ICSID"s arbitration. The tribunal held that "Loans and bonds are distinct financial products."
From the above arbitral jurisprudence, it is obvious that investment arbitration could be used in addressing claims arising from sovereign debt default. The determining factor is the language of the BIT under which the claims were founded as well as the intention of the parties. A definition of "investment" broad enough to include sovereign bonds will evince a clear intention to invoke the ISDS provisions in BITs and likely to receive the nod of ICSID and other arbitral tribunals in claims arising from SDR. Parties" BITs should determine whether it is included or excluded. 159 
IV. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE GAP IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON SDR
What emerged from the above decisions is that it is plausible and prudent (reverting back to Prof AbiSaab"s unanswered question) for international tribunals to assume jurisdiction over claims arising from sovereign debt defaults where the parties to BITs either expressly or by necessary implication included sovereign debts as covered investments. This, it is respectfully submitted, is more in line with the spirit of the progressive development of international law, itself anchored on the consent of states. 160 Policy considerations and historical conjectures must not be employed to undermine this fundamental principle. In the light of the problems of SDR framework, it is submitted that investment arbitration could aid in filling the existing vacuum on sovereign debt governance because parties" consent is also the fulcrum of ISDS. In other words, the use of arbitration could address the age-long vacuum in international finance with respect to SDR because of the significance of parties" consent. 161 Parties to BITs should determine the continued relevance of arbitration in SDR. No special regime of international law can ignore the position of parties" consent. 162 Negating parties" consent is simply doing violence to the root of international law itself. Indeed, international finance and international investment have the same purpose: to promote smooth commercial intercourse and support economic development of nations through the involvement of private and institutional capital providers.
Second, it is historically incorrect to detach sovereign debt from the underlying objectives of ICSID. ICSID was established to, among other objectives, provide "an international tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with Governments". 163 Claims arising from or connected with sovereign debt default are arguably within the scope of "financial and economic disputes with Governments". This is the umbilical connection between sovereign debt and international investment law as it relates to dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, international arbitration is clearly a major point of intersection between international financial law and international investment law. 164 Third, while the calls for a multilateral framework on sovereign debt restructuring continue to make analogies with corporate and sub-national insolvency regimes, 165 they tend to ignore the fact that a fairly balanced and effective SDR could also operate in the "shadow" of international investment law. This may address the one-sidedness of the present debt restructuring system. In fact, arbitral awards on sovereign debt defaults could actually empower the parties while at the same time minimising the politics that accompany institutional interventions in the matter.
Fourth, history has shown that the involvement of arbitral tribunals in sovereign debt crisis resolution is not really a new phenomenon. 166 Indeed, at a point they "were the only form of adjudication that proved remotely effective at resolving disputes arising out of sovereign default". 167 Investment treaty arbitration should therefore be seen as a continuation of the age-long efforts towards finding a normative framework that could create a level-playing ground between the parties and specifically address creditors" dilemma in SDR. In addition, ICSID tribunals could conveniently adjudicate over "loans" other than sovereign bonds contracts. In this situation, the existence of a BIT with substantive and procedural investment guarantees could form the basis for a claim by the creditors. certainly another option, but it is a costly option especially for the developing countries. States must either rethink/remodel their BITs to exclude sovereign debts instruments from the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals or they must be presumed to have implicitly consented to investment treaty arbitration.
In fact, the fear of creditor action itself could instill financial discipline to ensure proper utilization and management of foreign loans. While empowering bondholders and other creditors to use arbitration, it could also minimize institutional intervention by IMF and reduce moral hazard problems. Countries in need of foreign investments must balance their interests with those of their investors and creditors. The reservations against investment arbitration must be carefully addressed rather than rejecting it completely. A recent study found that "ISDS claims are directly proportional to FDI stock" and that "the growth in ISDS claims and the growth in outward FDI stock follow a similar trend". 174 In fact, more developed states are increasingly being subjected to the ISDS mechanisms. 175 Admittedly, sovereign debt restructuring consistently present challenges because of economic uncertainties, political risks and a clear absence of a comprehensive legal framework to govern such restructuring. It also opens the gate for vulture funds actions. 176 These however must not preclude creditors from submitting claims for arbitration in a depoliticized and more effective forum, which both the sovereign debtor and the home state of the creditors consensually agreed by way of treaty. Policy considerations must give way to prior consent of the parties. The direct and indirect advantages of ICSID and other arbitrations to the sovereign debt scheme are too enormous to ignore on the basis of technical gymnastics. Apart from effective and efficient enforcement, there is the "equality of arms" between the parties. In addition, one cannot ignore the fact that sometimes principles emerge out of adjudication. Although ICSID arbitration is not precedent-based 177 , the tribunals could aid in developing consistent, predictable and uniform principles that might form the basis for a normative framework on SDR globally. Investment arbitration could 174 therefore be a basis for the progressive development of this aspect of international law.
Finally, as promising as investment arbitration isin SDR it is not shielded from many challenges especially regarding costs of proceedings, length of proceedings, efficiency and unpredictability of outcomes. Preproceeding disputes prevention measures should be introduced into sovereign debt dispute management. ISDS cannot prevent sovereign debt disputes totally, but it canminimize them. This is an important window which should therefore remain open except where State parties to BITs expressly close such window.
